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This dissertation investigates two essential features of the US economy. First, it explores
how news about future productivity changes business cycle fluctuations. Using the a repre-
sentative agent model, it shows that implementation labor in workplace organization could be
an important channel through which news about the fundamentals can realistically generate
US business cycle fluctuations. Further this idea is extended using the perspective of sunspot
fluctuations. In particular, the model can lead to multiple equilibria under specific param-
eterizations. Second, a general equilibrium model has been developed with heterogeneous
agents to explain the wage polarization feature of the US labor market, particularly how the
price of an important technology is connected to lifetime earnings of agents and affects their
college decisions. The following summarizes the three chapters of my dissertation.
The first chapter which I co-authored with Dr. Blankenau, argues that purchasing invest-
ment goods does not directly increase the productive capacity of a business. Changes in the
business through the installation of capital, worker training, and workplace reorganization
are often required. These changes themselves are not easily automated. Change requires
workers. We build a model where investment requires a complementary labor input. This
mechanism is embedded in a representative agent model with capacity utilization, adjust-
ment costs, and separable preferences. We show that this environment can yield positive
co-movement between consumption, investment, and labor hours when the economy experi-
ences a news shock about future productivity, thus providing an additional channel through
which news shocks can generate key business cycle features.
The second chapter is an extension of the first chapter. I investigate the indeterminacy
in a representative agent model with implementation labor and increasing returns in pro-
duction. First, my analysis shows that a representative agent with implementation labor
can exhibit increasing returns to scale. Then I show that self-fulfilling beliefs of agents lead
to business cycle fluctuations in which multiple equilibria can arise under specific param-
eterizations. Specifically, implementation labor in the production of capital is the highly
important, necessary condition for the self-fulling equilibrium outcome.
The third chapter, which is also a joint work with Dr. Blankenau, discusses the wage
polarization feature of the US labor market. We build a general equilibrium model with
heterogeneous agents, showing how wage polarization can emerge when the price of com-
puter capital falls. Consequently, we find the share of the population with a college degree
decreases. Our findings are consistent with recent empirical data that show a U-shaped wage
growth pattern in the US as well as a slower growth rate of college-educated workers despite
the high returns of investing in education. In the model, we assume that each agent is born
with a portfolio of skills. Specifically, each agent can provide manual labor, routine labor,
and abstract labor and must decide how much of each to provide. An agent can increase
efficiency in all types of labor by attending college. All three types of labor are valued in the
labor market at an endogenously determined wage rate. Computer capital is a substitute for
routine labor. As its price falls and its quantity increases, agents with a relative aptitude for
routine labor no longer find it advantageous to attend college. Since routinization of tasks
harms middle-income agents, the model has government policy implications for observed
wage polarization.
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Abstract
This dissertation investigates two essential features of the US economy. First, it explores
how news about future productivity changes business cycle fluctuations. Using the a repre-
sentative agent model, it shows that implementation labor in workplace organization could be
an important channel through which news about the fundamentals can realistically generate
US business cycle fluctuations. Further this idea is extended using the perspective of sunspot
fluctuations. In particular, the model can lead to multiple equilibria under specific param-
eterizations. Second, a general equilibrium model has been developed with heterogeneous
agents to explain the wage polarization feature of the US labor market, particularly how the
price of an important technology is connected to lifetime earnings of agents and affects their
college decisions. The following summarizes the three chapters of my dissertation.
The first chapter which I co-authored with Dr. Blankenau, argues that purchasing invest-
ment goods does not directly increase the productive capacity of a business. Changes in the
business through the installation of capital, worker training, and workplace reorganization
are often required. These changes themselves are not easily automated. Change requires
workers. We build a model where investment requires a complementary labor input. This
mechanism is embedded in a representative agent model with capacity utilization, adjust-
ment costs, and separable preferences. We show that this environment can yield positive
co-movement between consumption, investment, and labor hours when the economy experi-
ences a news shock about future productivity, thus providing an additional channel through
which news shocks can generate key business cycle features.
The second chapter is an extension of the first chapter. I investigate the indeterminacy
in a representative agent model with implementation labor and increasing returns in pro-
duction. First, my analysis shows that a representative agent with implementation labor
can exhibit increasing returns to scale. Then I show that self-fulfilling beliefs of agents lead
to business cycle fluctuations in which multiple equilibria can arise under specific param-
eterizations. Specifically, implementation labor in the production of capital is the highly
important, necessary condition for the self-fulling equilibrium outcome.
The third chapter, which is also a joint work with Dr. Blankenau, discusses the wage
polarization feature of the US labor market. We build a general equilibrium model with
heterogeneous agents, showing how wage polarization can emerge when the price of com-
puter capital falls. Consequently, we find the share of the population with a college degree
decreases. Our findings are consistent with recent empirical data that show a U-shaped wage
growth pattern in the US as well as a slower growth rate of college-educated workers despite
the high returns of investing in education. In the model, we assume that each agent is born
with a portfolio of skills. Specifically, each agent can provide manual labor, routine labor,
and abstract labor and must decide how much of each to provide. An agent can increase
efficiency in all types of labor by attending college. All three types of labor are valued in the
labor market at an endogenously determined wage rate. Computer capital is a substitute for
routine labor. As its price falls and its quantity increases, agents with a relative aptitude for
routine labor no longer find it advantageous to attend college. Since routinization of tasks
harms middle-income agents, the model has government policy implications for observed
wage polarization.
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Implications for news driven business
cycles
1.1 Introduction
Capital investment at the firm level is often a component of broader change. A new computer
system means that workers will have new tasks added to their workload while others are
eliminated. New heavy equipment will not simply replace the old, but will change the
production process in important ways. Investment installation itself is a sort of change as
the firm’s activity is a departure from routine. Even additional capital which simply scales
capacity will cause change. Adding more trucks to a shipping fleet, for example, will change
how the firm is optimally managed.
The notion that investment brings change has received considerable attention in the
literature. So too has the complementary notion that change requires labor. Much of this
literature focuses in particular on the change brought about by the revolution in information
technology. A prominent example is the work of Bresnahan et al. (2002).1 They find a close
1Also see Autor et al. (1998), Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987), Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999), and Bryn-
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relationship between improved information technology and workplace reorganization. They
also show that this change itself cannot easily be automated. Labor is required to implement
the reorganization.
In this paper we take a broad view of the investment/labor demand relationship, assuming
that investment of any sort is more productive when ‘implementation labor’ is employed
to accommodate the firm-level changes. We consider the implications of implementation
labor for news driven business cycles. We build a model where news of future productivity
improvements changes firms’ investment demand. Changes in investment demand cause
changes in the demand for implementation labor. The productivity increase may be specific
to investment. Investment-specific technology change is often associated with information
technology. Following the way, we consider improvements in information technology as
highlighted by Bresnahan et al. (2002). The productivity increase may instead affect all
production symmetrically. It this case, we consider the effects of adding implementation
labor in a more standard setting.
We show that adding implementation labor to a representative agent model can im-
prove the model’s ability to generate current business cycles from news of future events.
A common relationship resulting from optimal agent behavior in representative agent, and
many other models, is that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and la-
bor is equal to the marginal productivity of labor. Beaudry and Portier (2004), Beaudry and
Portier (2007), Wang (2012) and others point out that this relationship presents a challenge
for modeling business cycles as resulting from news about future productivity.2, If news of
future productivity results in increased current consumption, the marginal rate of substi-
tution will increase. To preserve the relationship, the marginal productivity of labor must
increase; i.e. the labor input must fall. The relationship between consumption and labor
hour violates a key feature of business cycles: consumption and labor hours are positively
correlated. Beaudry and Portier (2007) refer to this as the ‘static problem’ and we adopt the
terminology. The challenge is not present with contemporaneous productivity shocks since
jolfsson and Mendelson (1993).
2See Sims (2013), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012).
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such shocks increase the marginal product of labor even after accounting for the general
equilibrium increase in employment.
The literature related to News-Driven Business Cycles (NDBC) explores several modi-
fications of the baseline representative agent model that overcome the static problem. We
show that implementation labor provides an additional useful modification of this sort. In
essence, a news shock influences the supply of labor used to implement new investment cap-
ital as well as labor used in the production of a final good. Labor used for implementation
enhances capital accumulation but has no impact on current production. Importantly, then,
implementation labor has no direct effect on the marginal product of labor and allows more
freedom of movement between the marginal rate of substitution and total labor employed.
Our model is most closely related to Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). Their model has three
key features which together allow consumption, investment, and labor hours to increase in
response to a positive news shock. First they set the depreciation rate for capital equal to the
endogenously determined rate of capacity utilization. An increase in capacity utilization has
a similar effect to an increase is capital. With more capital employed, the marginal product
of labor increases. The increase in capital with labor productivity help to overcome the
static problem. Second they include adjustment costs which helps in assuring that current
consumption is positively correlated with news of future productivity changes.
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) demonstrate that these two features of the law of motion
for the capital stock fall short in generating the desired comovements in response to a news
shock. A third feature, non-separable preferences, is essential. Their preference weakens the
relationship between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor.
Our model does not include the third feature. We instead include an additional term in the
law of motion for capital meant to capture the salient features the investment/labor demand
relationship. Our new law of motion in the representative agent model able to generate news-
driven business cycles even without the special utility function introduced in Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2009).
We first consider a special case of our model with no adjustment costs which allows
us to analytically examine conditions allowing positive comovement between consumption,
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investment, and total labor hours. Importantly, we show that our new feature gives a boost
to the effects of the capacity utilization rate. With the boost, capacity utilization can respond
sufficiently to a news shock to allow a general equilibrium increase in the marginal product
of labor at the same time that labor employed increases. Absent implementation labor, this
cannot occur.
Moreover, we show that whether the increase in both labor hour and marginal productiv-
ity is closely related to returns to scale in the production of investment goods. In particular,
we show that increasing returns to scale is a sufficient condition for comovement across these
key variables. Because of increasing returns to scale, our results are related to those of Guo
et al. (2015) in two ways. They show that a production externality can overcome the static
problem. They focus on a production spillover that results in increasing returns to scale
at the social level despite constant returns to scale at the firm level. There is no similar
externality in our model. However, investment is produced using a final good and imple-
mentation labor. The final good is a standard Cobb-Douglas combination of capital and
labor with constant returns to scale. Investment combines this final good with a second sort
of labor input. Special type of investment allows the possibility of constant returns to scale
in the production of the final good with increasing returns to scale for investment. Another
commonality of our model with Guo et al. (2015) is that with increasing returns to scale, the
model may be indeterminate. We characterize conditions which give rise to indeterminacy
in the second chapter of this dissertation. Here, we restrict our parameter choices to cases
where the model is determinate.
In our special case, the model can overcome the static problem. Beaudry and Portier
(2007) also articulate the ‘dynamic problem’ of news driven business cycles. A future pro-
ductivity increase is a positive lifetime income shock. The resulting consumption smoothing
is a positive force affecting current consumption. At the same time, investment may increase
as firms gear up for the anticipated productivity increase. The rise in productivity weighs
in weighs in favor of decreased current consumption through the resources constraint. A
news driven business cycle model must find a way for output to respond sufficiently, and its
allocation to respond properly, such that consumption and investment both increase.
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Our special case does not overcome the dynamic problem. As in Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009), we need adjustment costs for positive productivity shocks to yield both an increase
is consumption and positive comovement between consumption, investment, labor hours,
and output. The remainder of the paper, then, includes adjustment costs and considers the
impact of implementation labor in our full model. We show that our model with imple-
mentation labor, variable capacity utilization, and investment adjustment cost can generate
qualitatively realistic aggregate fluctuations driven by news shock to total factor productivity
and investment specific technological change.
One caveat of the standard business cycle model is that it does not offer the realistic
aggregate fluctuations of the key macroeconomic variables. Recent literature provides various
modifications of the existing models to accommodate the realistic business cycles due to news
shock. For example, Beaudry and Portier (2007) show a multi-sector model with internal cost
complementarities between the production of different goods able to increase consumption,
investment and output due to a positive news shock. They also argue that a two-sector
model with no substitutability between consumption and investment is a potential candidate
for expectation driven boom and bust cycles. Also, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009); Eusepi
and Preston (2011) introduce particular kinds of preferences in the neo-classical setup to
achieve NDBC. Other examples that exhibit potential candidate for NDBC are models with
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale or externalities (Khan and Tsoukalas,
2012; Guo et al., 2015). The idea of the NDBC is also extended using a New-Keynesian setup
(Christiano et al., 2010; Eusepi and Preston, 2011). They find that sticky prices combined
with a particular type of monetary policy are needed to generate NDBC. In this case, the
monetary policy must to sufficiently accommodative to the news. In addition, Den Haan
and Kaltenbrunner (2009) show that convex adjustment costs of labor in the value function
within a search and friction model creates a boom in response to good news.
In this chapter, we consider a neo-classical model with implementation labor that allows
sufficient labor demand and capital utilization to exhibit news-driven business cycle. In
particular, we examine the possibility of booms or busts with constant returns to scale in
technology and without any market imperfection. We provide a novel mechanism which
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explains why market economies exhibit business cycle fluctuations driven by changes in
expectations.
In the next section we present our model. Our work is most closely related to Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2009) so we pay particular attention to our point of departure with their work.
In particular we highlight that a key feature of their model, non-separable preferences, is not
required in our model. In the third section, we present a special case to provide intuition
into the effects of implementation labor. In the fourth section, we show the model’s results
in the benchmark case, with a focus on impulse responses to news shocks. In the final section
we summarize and discuss an extension to this work.
1.2 The Model
The economy is populated by a mass of identical agents who derive utility from consuming
a final good in each period and disutility from providing a labor input. With ct and nt














Here Eo is the expectations operator, β < 1 is the discount rate, φ > 0 gauges the disutility
of hours worked and σ, γ ≥ 0 govern elasticities.
A representative firm combines capital and labor to produce the final good subject to a
Cobb-Douglas production function with share parameter α ∈ [0, 1] and general productivity
parameter at > 0. In general, capital employed by the firm will be some share, ut, of the
total capital stock available to the economy, kt. Moreover, the labor input in the final good






The final good can be utilized as a consumption good or an investment good, it, with
the resource constraint given by




The rate at which a unit of the final good can be converted to a unit of the investment
good depends on the technology parameter vt.
3 An increase vt reflects investment-specific
technological progress and a decrease is technological regress. General and investment-
specific technological progress are stochastic and governed by




2,t−j j > 0, (1.4)




2,t−j j > 0, (1.5)
where ρa, ρv ∈ (0, 1) and j > 0.
The law of motion for capital contains two of the key features driving business cycles
in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). First, the rate of depreciation is positively related to the













where ϕ2 > 0.
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) demonstrate that these features of the law of motion
fall short in generating the desired comovements in response to a news shock. Their third
feature, non-separable preferences, is essential. Since preferences are separable in our model,
an alternative feature is required. We assume that purchasing investment goods can more
effectively add to the capital stock when combined with separate labor input, ni,t. We refer





























1/κ where θi, θn ≥ 0, κ ≤ 1, represents our generalization of the law
3This specification is similar to Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000, 1988).
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of motion consistent with the discussion in the previous section. Through the expression,
increments to the capital stock from investment depend upon how much labor is hired to
implement the investment. The parameters θi and θn gauge the relative importance of
investment and implementation services in producing physical capital and while κ governs
their substitutability.
The above expression is meant to capture lessons from recent firm-level investigations of
how technological change influences the structure of the firm. Absent the mechanism, the low
of motion implicitly assumes that investment effortlessly increases productive capacity by
having, for example, a new machine ready to go. However, consider the case of an investment
in information technology (IT). Bresnahan et al. (2002) show that such investment leads to
changes in organizational practices and even to changes in products and services. The
purchase of information technology is the start, not the end, of the investment process. We
argue that these remaining efforts are not easily mechanized and require a targeted labor
input.
Like Bresnahan et al. (2002), much of the literature along these lines has focused in par-
ticular on IT investment, and for good reason. The quality-adjusted real price of computers
has been declining at a compound rate of about 20% per year. Several studies suggest that
the internal organization of the firm has been reshaped by the economics of information
and communication.4 To some extent we capture the organizational change by allowing a
decrease in the price of investment through vt. However, we take a broader view and assume
that any sort of investment will require change in the firm and labor to implement it. Equip-
ment of nearly any sort will be an improvement upon prior investment. A work environment
optimized for one vintage of capital will not likely be optimized for the next. Training and
restructuring will be required whether the investment is in IT or heavy equipment. Even
investment in equipment which is just more of the same will require installation. Moreover,
if investment reflects growth of the firm, the optimal structure may change for that reason
alone. Our addition to the law of motion for capital is meant to be a general modeling of
4Examples include Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Brynjolfsson and Mendelson (1993), Radner (1993),
and Black and Lynch (2001).
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the notion that investment brings firm-level change, and change requires labor.
Because not all investment expenditure is reflected in it, total output will not be reflected
by production of the final good. The value of output in this economy is the sum of final
goods production (our numeraire good) and the value of the services provided in putting
investment goods into production. Looking ahead to an equilibrium, labor will have the
same wage, wt, whether employed in final goods production or investment implementation.
The value of the implementation services, then will be equal to wtni,t and total output is
given by
Yt = yt + wtni,t. (1.7)
To solve the model, the social planner chooses ct, nf,t, ni,t, it, kt+1 and ut to maximize the
equation (1.1) subject to equations (1.3), (1.6) and (1.2) and nf,t + ni,t = nt. Substituting
in for the last two constraints, and defining λt and λk,t as the Lagrangian multipliers on the
first two constraints, first order conditions (F.O.Cs) are given by
c−σt = λt (1.8)
φ(nf,t + ni,t)






































































Combining equations (1.8) and (1.9) gives
φnγt c
σ




which is the usual relationship equating the marginal rate of substitution between nt and
ct to the marginal product of labor. As noted by Beaudry and Portier (2014), this funda-
mental relationship exposes two challenges to modeling new-driven business cycles. The first
challenge is to have positive news cause an increase in ct and the second is to preserve the
equality given this increase.
To replicate key business cycle facts, consumption, investment and labor hours should
all have positive comovement. Through the resource constraint, the above expression will
assure positive comovement with output. News of a positive future productivity shock may
lead to an increase in current consumption. A future productivity increase is a positive
lifetime income shock. The resulting consumption smoothing is a positive force affecting
current consumption. At the same time, investment may increase as firms gear up for the
anticipated productivity increase. The relationship weighs in weighs in favor of decreased
current consumption through the resources constraint. Absent an increase in output, in-
creased current investment requires decreased current consumption. A news driven business
cycle model must find a way for output to respond sufficiently, and its allocation to respond
properly, such that consumption and investment both increase. The output increase cannot
rely on technology changes or increased capital as these are fixed in the current period. The
relationship is what Beaudry and Portier refer to as the ‘dynamic challenge’ of news driven
business cycles.
A model that overcomes the dynamic challenge assures comovement between consump-
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tion, investment, and output. It still faces a ‘static challenge’ to assure positive comovement
with hours.5 With ct increased, other general equilibrium adjustments must preserve equal-
ity in equation (1.15). There might be a decrease in nt on the left-hand-side. However, the
relationship violates the required positive correlation between ct and nt. The other possi-
bility is to increase the right-hand-side of the equality. That is, the model could generate
an increase in the marginal product of labor when consumption increases. The increasing of
right-hand-side, too, is problematic. In general, the marginal product of labor is decreasing
in labor. To increase this would require less labor employed in producing the final good.
We show later with numerical exercises that nt and nf,t are positively correlated over a
wide range or parameters and make this assumption for now. In this case, increasing the
marginal product of labor through a decrease in nf,t means that nt falls. The relationship
again violates positive correlation between ct and nt.
One feature of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) helps toward overcoming both the dynamic
and the static problem. Variable capacity utilization in their model allows the economy
to respond to future productivity by utilizing, and hence depreciating, capital at a higher
rate. The above expression allows output to increase with fixed capital and technology,
creating the possibility that investment and consumption could both increase. A second
feature of their model, properly calibrated adjustment costs, assures a proper allocation of
this increased output and generates the appropriate relationship between ct and it.
Aside from its part in solving the dynamic problem, variable capacity utilization mit-
igates, but does not eliminate, the static problem. To see this, substitute the production










With at and kt fixed at time t, an increase in the left-hand side through an increase in
ct, and an increase in the numerator through comovement between ct and nf,t, might be
accommodated through an increase in the capacity utilization rate. Essentially, an increase
5We are again using the terminology of Beaudry and Portier (2014).
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in ut increases the marginal product of labor at any level of nf,t. The above expression
allows for the possibility that both nf,t and the marginal product of labor could increase.
The increase in nf,t, through its impact on yt, amplifies the effect of increased capacity
utilization in overcoming the dynamic problem.
1.3 A special case
In this subsection we show that in a special case, capacity utilization falls short of overcoming
the static problem. We consider a simpler law of motion where ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3 = κ = 0 and











In this case there are no adjustment costs and implementation labor scales investment in






















where x1 is a positive scalar. All exponents in equation (1.19) are positive. With θn =
0, hours show up only in the denominator so it not possible for ct and hours worked to
both increase while preserving the equality. With θn positive, labor hours are also in the
numerator. The relationship makes comovement possible as the denominator may increase
more than the numerator when hours increase. It is not clear whether the denominator
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will increase sufficiently since ni,t and nf,t are related and nt = ni,t + nf,t . However, when
preferences are logarithmic in consumption and linear in the labor input (σ = 1, γ = 0), nf,t
and ni,t are linearly related to nt such that
ni,t =
θnnt
θn + 1− α
− θn(1− α)




θn + 1− α
+
θn(1− α)
φ(θn + 1− α)
. (1.21)





Returning to equation (1.15), the static problem is that (i) the marginal rate of substi-
tution is increasing in consumption and (ii) the marginal product of labor is decreasing in
labor. Either (i) or (ii) must be overcome in some way to allow consumption and labor to
simultaneously increase. Capacity utilization in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) is not enough
to overcome (ii). They overcome (i) by introducing a more generalized set of preferences
that allows the MRS to decrease in ct. We instead allow a more general setting in the law of
motion for capital to overcome (ii). The co-movement works through increasing the response
of capacity utilization to a news shock.
It may appear that our model is highly susceptibility to a particular concern with using
capacity utilization as the channel through which news drives business cycles. With variable
capacity utilization, a news shock increases capital through increased investment. However,
it also decreases capital through increased depreciation. The mechanism can associate news
shocks with decreased capital in the subsequent period. As our model gives increased scope
to capacity utilization, the second effect is amplified. In our model, however, there is an-
other feature favoring an increase in capital. As seen in equation (1.18) capacity utilization
is associated with an increase in ni,t. This, in turn, is associated with more productive im-
plementation of investment through equation (1.6). The relationship makes it easier for our
model to generate an increase in kt+1 resulting from a news shock.
13
A nice feature of the mechanism we introduce is that it makes it easier for news shocks
to be associated with current increases in labor productivity. The mechanism is easiest to
see in the final goods market. Using equations (1.2) and (1.18) we arrive at the following

















Each exponent here is positive. We see that with θ = 0, hours appear only in the denominator
so productivity and hours move in opposite directions. With θ > 0, both can increase. In
the special case expressed in equations (1.20) and (1.21), we can show that θ > (ϕ1 − 1) is
a sufficient condition for positive comovement between hours and labor productivity.
1.3.1 The static problem with no adjustment costs
The argument above suggests that implementation effort can overcome the static challenge
of news driven business cycles and shows this analytically for a special case. It does not
suggest that this mechanism is helpful in overcoming the dynamic problem, and indeed
we find that is not. As in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), we need adjustment costs in
order for positive productivity shocks to yield both an increase is consumption and positive
comovement between consumption, investment, labor hours, and output. In this subsection,
we omit adjustment costs in order to focus on overcoming the static problem. Without
adjustment costs, consumption decreases when the model generates the proper comovements.
When we later add adjustment costs, the model generates these comovements along with an
increase in consumption.
We first consider our special case above and then relax several of the assumptions in
turn to show their impact on the comovement between consumption, hours, and investment.
We show in the second chapter of this dissertation that in our special case the model can
be indeterminate and find sufficient conditions where this can hold. For current purposes,
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it is sufficient to have some intuition for why this can occur.6 Let st be the endogenously
determined share of the final good that is invested in period t so that from equation (1.3)
it = stvtyt. Then with no adjustment costs, we can write equation (1.6) as










The left-hand side of this is gross capital formation. From the right-hand side we see that
gross capital formation is a function of yt and ni,t. The final good, yt, is constant returns
to scale in kt and nf,t. Given this, gross capital formation is constant returns to scale in
all inputs if θi + θn = 1. However, θi + θn > 1, we have increasing returns to scale in this
aggregate. Prior literature shows that indeterminacy can arise in models with increasing
returns to scale in the production of the final good. Increasing returns to scale in gross
capital formation gives rise to similar concerns in our model. While this is most clear in
our special case, the issue of indeterminacy is robust. In particular we show in numerical
exercises that the model can generally be indeterminate when θi + θn exceeds 1 and β or ϕ1
is sufficiently large.
Our goal is to generate news driven business cycles in a deterministic setting rather than
consider sunspot equilibria. For this reason, the possibility of indeterminacy restricts our
parameter choices. The model in determinate in our baseline calibration of the full model
below. The determinacy holds also for the sensitivity analysis conducted around the baseline.
However, the parameter restrictions in this special case are more severe. In particular, the
next chapter shows that sufficient conditions for indeterminacy restrict us to relatively small
values of θn. With small values of θn, the current response to future productivity changes
is small. Nonetheless, the special case is useful for showing how implementation effort can
yield the proper directional changes in the aggregates of interest.
6See Benhabib and Farmer (1994) for a further discussion of indeterminacy with increasing returns.
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1.3.2 Results in the special case
Figure 1 below shows the current period response to news of a one-period-ahead total factor
productivity increase equal to 1 of its mean value. It is common in the literature to consider
news that pre-dates productivity increases by multiple periods. We choose a one-period-
ahead shock for this discussion only to make the response larger for expositional purposes.
To avoid indeterminacy we set β = .82 which means that shocks further in the future have a
small impact in the current period. Our qualitative findings are not sensitive to this, and we
later consider a more standard time frame. We set parameters in the baseline for this exercise
consistent with our special case: ψ1 = ψ2 = κ = γ = 0 and α = 1. We further set α = .33,
ϕ1 = 1.1, vt = ψ2 = 1 and ρa = .9. The parameter ϕ2 influences the capacity utilization
rate. With this set to 1, we have a capacity utilization rate in excess of 1. While this does
not cause mathematical problems in the model, it creates a challenge for interpreting the
results. For this reason, we set ϕ2 = 5. While the dynamics are qualitatively similar between
ϕ2 = 5 and ϕ2 = 1, the larger value allows for reasonable capacity utilization values.
Figure 1.1 shows the current percentage deviation of consumption, investment, and labor
Figure 1.1: Comovement for different values of θn.
hours from their steady state values. We show the IRFs for a range of θn values holding
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θi fixed at 1. The first panel shows that the effect of a news shock on consumption is
non-monotonic in θn. For small and large values of θn, the productivity shock decreases
consumption. For moderate values, it increases consumption. The second panel shows that
the impact of the shock on investment and labor hours decreases with θn. It shows that
without our feature, i.e., when θn = 0, consumption moves in the opposite direction of
investment and labor hours. With θn sufficiently large, the three items move in the same
direction. Through the resource constraint, we know output also increases. Stated differently,
we generate observed comovements across these aggregates and hence overcome the static
problem with θn large. With θn small, we do not. While we show this only for the special
case and only for the total factor productivity shock, we find in the subsequent section that
this also holds with the investment specific shock and over a wide range of parameter values.
1.4 Results in the baseline model
We now turn to our baseline model. In this section, we consider a calibrated version of
our model. We examine the economy’s response as the representative agent learns about an
upcoming change in productivity. We consider only parameters which maintain saddle path
stability and a unique equilibrium. We assume that the economy is in its non-stochastic
steady state at time zero. At period one, an unanticipated news shock arrives. The rep-
resentative agent learns that total factor productivity (or investment specific productivity)
will change three periods later, in period 4. Following a one standard deviation news shock,
the level of at (or vt), does not increase immediately, by construction, but rises sharply at
period 4 and returns to its steady state value over the horizon as expressed in equations
(1.12) and (1.14).
We present our baseline model results into two parts. First, we consider the case of com-
plementarity between investment and implementation labor in the production of capital,
κ ≤ 0. We consider this case of complementarity to be most consistent with the data. For
example, Bresnahan et al. (2002) show that investment and workplace organization labor
are complements. Next, we consider the case of high substitutability between investment
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and implementation labor in production function of capital 0 < κ ≤ 1. We mainly show
that comovements in macroeconomic variables can be achieved when investment and imple-
mentation labor are complementary in the production of capital. In case of substitutability
between the two, our model does not generate comovements.
Figure 1.2: Impulse responses from TFP news shocks in the baseline model.
Figure 1.2 shows the impulse response results in our baseline model with complemen-
tarity between investment and implementation labor. In each panel, the line represents the
impulse response of the respective variables due to the total factor productivity (TFP) news
shock. We adopt the following parameterization that is commonly used in the real business
cycle literature. The income share of capital, α, is 0.33; the discount factor, β, is 0.985;
labor supply elasticity, γ, is 0 (i.e., perfectly elastic), and, σ = 1 (logarithmic utility in
consumption). The preference parameter, φ, is 1; the capital utilization parameter, ϕ, is 1.3;
the adjustment cost parameters are ψ1 = 1 ψ2 = 2, and ψ1 = 3. We set the elasticity of sub-
stitution parameter, κ, to -8. The relative importance of investment, θi, and implementation
labor, θn, in capital production are 0.5 and 0.5, respectively.
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The first panel of Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between the news shock and total
factor productivity. News arrives in period 1. Since this is news of a future increase in
productivity, there is no immediate change in total factor productivity. Total factor produc-
tivity remains unchanged for four periods and then increases. Due to the AR(1) structure,
the shock dies out through time, and total factor productivity returns eventually to its
baseline.
The remaining panels show that the economy begins to adjust immediately to the news
shock in anticipation of the eventual productivity increase. Recall in our special case that
consumption decreased when the economy experienced a positive news shock. The reduction
was due to a desire to build up capital in response to its future increased productivity.
Here we have added adjustment costs. As a result, rapid increases in the capital stock are
costly. The adjustment cost allows a countervailing effect to dominate. Improved future
productivity increases lifetime income, resulting in increased consumption in all periods.
That is, adjustment costs allow the model to avoid the dynamic problem.
As discussed above, from equation (1.15) an increase in consumption must be met with
an increase in marginal productivity of labor. With a contemporaneous shock, the exogenous
productivity improvement would generate increased marginal productivity of labor. With
exogenous productivity and with the current capital stock fixed, this occurs through an
increase in capacity utilization (panel 7). With implementation labor, the capacity utilization
response is large enough to allow both increased labor in the production of the final good
(panel 3) and increased productivity of labor (panel 9).
The initial effect on labor for investment is positive but small. It happens because two
competing effects nearly offset with this parametrization. The increase in investment causes
an increase in the demand for investment labor. However, as mentioned above (and suggested
by equation (1.18)), implementation labor makes capacity utilization more responsive to
productivity increases. The resulting large increase in the capacity utilization rate has a
direct effect on productivity in the production of the final good, but has no direct effect on
the productivity of implementation labor. Particularly, this relationship biases any increase
in total labor toward increases in labor for final goods.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses from IST news shock in the baseline model.
Each of these effects described for period one continue as time passes and the productivity
shock becomes imminent. By periods 2 and 3, hours, output and investment have increased
even more. The effect on consumption decreases over this time frame but remains positive.
Thus our one sector model is able to generate qualitatively realistic business cycles driven
solely by agents’ changing expectations about future productivity.
Results are similar to an investment specific technology shock (IST). In our model, this
corresponds to an anticipated decrease in vt. Figure 1.3 presents the impulse responses due
to a favorable IST news shock. The organization is similar to that of Figure 1.2. At period
1, when the economy receives the news that more efficient and cheaper investment goods
will be available in period 4, all the variables increase on impact. Consumption falls between
period one and period four but starts rising again when the productivity increase arrives.
The other impulse responses also follow similar patterns to the case with TFP shocks. There
are some differences, but these do not stem principally from our mechanism. For example,
labor productivity eventually decreases. The rise is due to an increase in labor employed with
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses from TFP news shocks with high elasticity of substitution.
the same productivity parameter rather than stemming more deeply from implementation
technology.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 correspond to the impulse responses for TFP and IST news shocks
when investment and labor are substitutes. We set κ = 0.1 and otherwise use the baseline
parameters. When investment and implementation labor are substitutes, our model does not
generate positive comovements among the variables in response to anticipated technological
changes. On impact, both types of labor and investment fall due to both TFP and IST news
shocks as shown respectively in Figures 4 and 5. In this case, the largest immediate effect is a
negative effect on labor for investment. With investment and labor substitutes, the effect of
adjustment costs is muted. Rather than increasing the capital stock with investment alone,
it is easier to substitute labor for this and avoid the rapidly increasing cost of adjusting.
As a result, little occurs in terms of investment, capital utilization, or output until the
productivity increase is closer to arriving. Work effort shifts away from the present and
toward the future as a means of smoothing.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse responses from IST news shocks with high elasticity of substitution.
Next, we focus on the relative importance of investment and implementation services in
producing physical capital to generate news-driven business cycles. In particular, we change
the corresponding values of θi and θn taking θn = 0.001 and θi = 0.999. Figures 1.6 and 1.7
present impulse responses of our baseline model, respectively, for both TFP and IST news
shocks. In both cases, a low share of implementation labor in capital production does not
generate comovement. In particular, consumption increases while hours and investment fall
in period 1. The result is consistent with our discussion in the special case. With a weak
role for implementation labor, the mechanism is insufficient to overcome the ‘static problem’
expressed in equation (1.15). Intuitively, a sufficient boost of capacity utilization is required
for comovements. The co-movement requires at least a moderate role for labor input in
capital production to generate realistic comovements among variables.
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Figure 1.6: Impulse responses from TFP news shocks in the model with θn = 0.001.
In summary, we show that introducing implementation labor in capital production allows
an otherwise standard general equilibrium model model to produce realistic business cycles
in response to an expectation of future technological changes. For our calibration of the
model, this holds for either type of productivity improvement. However, a sufficient level of
complementarity and a sufficient relative weight on implementation labor is required.
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Figure 1.7: Impulse responses from IST news shocks in the model with θn = 0.001.
1.5 Conclusion
The literature related to news-driven business cycles explores several modifications of the
baseline real business cycle model that overcome the static and the dynamic problem. We
show that implementation labor provides an additional useful modification of this sort. We
begin by arguing that purchasing investment goods does not directly increase the productive
capacity of the firm. Workplace reorganization, new management, training, and screening of
new workers are often required with the changes in the firm. We motivate the organization
changes from recent empirical findings that technological innovation is highly correlated with
changes in firms’ workplace organization and with the demand for labor to implement these
changes Bresnahan et al. (2002).
We build a representative agent model that captures these changes in the firm through
complementarity between investment and labor input. In essence, a news shock influences
the demand for labor used to implement new investment capital as well as capital utilization.
Labor used for implementation enhances capital utilization but has no impact on current
production. Importantly, then, implementation labor has no direct effect on the marginal
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product of labor. Implementation labor allows more freedom of movement between the
marginal rate of substitution and total labor employed.
We first consider a special case of our model with no adjustment costs which allows
us to analytically examine conditions allowing positive comovement between consumption,
investment, and total labor hours. Importantly, we show that our new feature gives a boost
to the effects of the capacity utilization rate. With this boost, capacity utilization can
respond sufficiently to a news shock to allow a general equilibrium increase in the marginal
product of labor at the same time that labor employed increases. Absent implementation
labor, the co-movement cannot occur.
We then solve the dynamic problem for the general case. In particular, we include adjust-
ment costs and consider the impact of implementation labor in our full model. We show that
our model with implementation labor, variable capacity utilization, and investment adjust-
ment cost can generate qualitatively realistic aggregate fluctuations driven by news shocks to
total factor productivity and investment-specific technological change. Key parameters for
achieving our results are the substitutability between investment and implementation labor,
and the relative importance of implementation labor for increasing the capital stock.
This paper highlights the ability of implementation labor to deal with the static problem
inherent in new-driven business cycles. The next step will be to place our mechanism in
a somewhat fuller model along the lines of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and explore the
extent to which we can improve the fit of such models to observed data. We will examine in
particular its effectiveness in explaining observed stochastic properties. We anticipate that
the model will allow greater freedom in choosing appropriate utility functions and parameters
since the static problem will not necessitate the use of non-separable preferences.
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Chapter 2
Indeterminacy and increasing returns
to scale with implementation labor
2.1 Introduction
The literature shows that a general equilibrium model with sufficient increasing returns
in production results in an indeterminate steady state driven by agent self-fulfilling be-
liefs (See Benhabib and Farmer (1994); Farmer and Guo (1994), and others).1 According
to Farmer (2016), indeterminacy can be interpreted in two different ways. Using Farmer
(2016)’s terminology, the first generation indeterminacy is introduced by Benhabib and
Farmer (1994). They define indeterminacy as the possibility of having a continuum of equilib-
rium paths that converge to a unique steady state. The second generation of indeterminacy
is developed up by Farmer and others displays multiple steady-state equilibrium unemploy-
ment rates or infinite equilibria close to each other. In both cases, non-fundamental shocks
like sunspot or animal-spirit shocks may contribute to the economic fluctuations. In this
paper, we focus the indeterminacy introduced by Benhabib and Farmer (1994).
Existing literature offers a few dynamic general equilibrium models that exhibit indeter-
minate equilibria. One of the keys to having indeterminacy of the first generation is large
1In this paper, the terms “self-fulfilling beliefs” and “sunspots” are used interchangeably. The term refers
to any randomness in the economy not related to uncertainties based on economic fundamentals.
26
increasing returns to scale in the labor input. Higher labor productivity means competitive
firms will pay higher wages at equilibrium with more employment. Optimistic households
decide to work more as the expectation of higher wages becomes self-fulfilling.2 In this
paper, we extend this idea by incorporating the implementation labor into the production
process in a one sector representative agent model. In particular, we take a broad view of the
investment-labor demand relationship, assuming that investment of any sort is more efficient
when implementation labor accommodates firm-level changes.3
We pick the one-sector standard business cycle model augmented with implementation
labor following Blankenau and Farah (2017).4 For simplicity, we consider a special case
of a model with no adjustment costs, which allows us to analyze the conditions for an
indeterminate steady state. In this type of model, business demand for implementation
labor coincides with future technological advances and the corresponding rise in investment
demand. We show in our analysis that a representative agent model with implementation
labor can exhibit increasing returns to scale. Existing literature shows that indeterminacy
can arise in models with increasing returns to scale in the production of the end product. In
contrast, we show that the source of indeterminacy in a model with implementation labor
is due to increasing returns to scale in the production of capital goods. Then we show that
self-fulfilling beliefs of agents lead to business cycle fluctuations, in which multiple equilibria
can arise under specific parametrization.
Our model and the existence of indeterminacy of the first generation is comparable to Ben-
habib and Farmer (1994, 1996), Wen (1998), Weder (2005), and Guo and Harrison (2001)
and can be explained as follows. Suppose the representative agent is optimistic about future
2 Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model provides dynamic arguments using non-standard slopes of the labor
demand and supply curves, with strong increasing returns to labor input. In their framework, the labor
demand curve is upward sloping and steeper than the labor supply curve.
3The notion that investment brings change has received considerable attention in the literature. Much
of this literature focuses on the change brought about by the revolution in information technology. A
prominent example is the work of Bresnahan et al. (2002). They find a close relationship between improved
information technology and workplace reorganization. They also show that this change itself cannot easily
be automated. Labor is required to implement reorganization. See also Autor et al. (1998), Bartel and
Lichtenberg (1987), Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999), and Brynjolfsson and Mendelson (1993).
4 Blankenau and Farah (2017) show that adding implementation labor to a representative agent can
improve the model’s ability to generate realistic business cycles from news about future events in the economy.
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returns on investment and decides to invest more. The rise in demand for investment will
increase the investment price. If increasing returns in business capital production are strong
enough to yield higher labor productivity, the rate of return on today’s investment will rise.
As a result, the agent’s initial optimistic expectations become self-fulfilling. Hence, indeter-
minacy is more likely to occur when increasing returns to scale in the production process is
high enough. In our model, demand for labor increases through the implementation labor
when investment rises. More labor input leads to higher labor productivity due to increasing
returns to scale in labor input. As the marginal product of labor increases, so does the
marginal product of capital. Moreover, variable capital utilization raises the equilibrium
output as labor hours increase. As the demand for implementation labor increases, output
increases, consumption and investment rise, and the economy moves to a new saddle path.
The self-fulfilling beliefs of agents on the return on investment lead the economy to choose
another trajectory to equilibrium path to converge to the unique steady states. Hence, we
have indeterminacy in our model.
The literature on both the “sunspot” business cycle fluctuations and the “news-driven”
business cycle provides an equilibrium outcome within the rational expectation framework,
but a key difference between the two is that the first emphasizes random changes in ex-
pectations independent of fluctuations in the economy rather than shocks to fundamentals.
These expectations are characterized as self-fulfilling. News-driven fluctuations, on the other
hand, do not require self-fulfilling expectations equilibrium in the economy, requiring only
an information set under which future shocks are anticipated. The causes of fluctuations
are distinct, but we must understand situations where indeterminacy can arise in the model
with implementation labor. We characterize conditions that give rise to indeterminacy in
this paper, showing that mild increasing returns to scale are not enough to create indeter-
minate equilibria in our model. Instead, only a sufficiently large implementation labor share
in the investment function can cause sunspot equilibria.
Our results are similar to those of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo
(1994) in two ways. Previous research shows that externality is a prerequisite for increasing
returns to scale (IRTS) in the aggregate production function. Their focus on production
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spillover that results in increasing returns to scale at the social level despite constant returns
to scale at the individual business level is dissimilar to the externality in our model. However,
in both their research and ours, investment is produced using a final good. The final good
is a standard Cobb-Douglas combination of capital and labor with constant returns to scale.
Investment combines this final good with a second type of labor input, allowing the possibility
of constant returns to scale in producing the final good along with increasing returns to scale
for the investment function. Another commonality between our model and theirs is that
with sufficient increasing returns to scale, the model is indeterminate.5 Our model, in using
implementation labor, does provide a novel channel through which self-fulfilling expectations
can propagate business cycle fluctuations.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 intuitively describes how increasing
returns to scale cause sunspot/indeterminate equilibria. Section 2.3 presents the model.
Section 2.4 examines the plausibility of increasing returns to scale in our model. Section 2.5
explains the methodology for deriving the condition for self-fulling equilibria and the proper-
ties of indeterminacy. Section 2.6 describes the results, and Section 2.7 discusses conclusions.6
2.2 Indeterminacy in a Real Business Cycle model with
increasing returns to scale
How does indeterminate equilibrium in a model connect to the increasing returns to scale
in a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model? In this section, we provide an intuitive explana-
tion. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) show that increasing returns to scale requires a sufficiently
high value of external effects. In their simple RBC model, increasing returns to scale come
from the social production function (Yt). The firm level output (yt) is produced by the
5Also, Eusepi (2009) and Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2006), among others, show that a general equilibrium
model with increasing returns to scale in aggregate production has great potential of sunspot driven equilibria.
6All the derivations and proofs are in the Appendix B.
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Here, Yt is the economy’s social output taken as given by each individual firm, with η denoting







where kt and nt are the capital stocks and hours worked. The parameter η denotes the size
of the externalities: with η = 0, the model becomes a standard RBC model with constant
returns to scale in production, while η > 0 indicates increasing returns to scale in the social
production function. This type of production function is commonly used Guo et al. (2015);
Eusepi (2009) to capture IRTS in an RBC framework.
Benhabib and Farmer (1994) explain the economic intuition of indeterminacy in a one
sector IRTS model as follows. When agents suddenly start believing that the shadow price of
investment increases over its present value and it is profitable to invest more now, they will
reallocate consumption to investment. The falling marginal product of capital due to high
investment will be offset by an increase in the shadow price of capital. The increasing shadow
price will validate agent beliefs that higher rates of investment will yield a higher return.
However, in the absence of externalities, a balanced path will over-accumulate capital and
violate the transversality conditions. The agent will never consume enough to justify such a
sacrifice for investment.
Suppose, now the model has sufficient externalities to permit multiple equilibria. If
the agents believe there is an alternative saddle path where the price of investment is higher
than the current value, then the higher price diverts consumption to investment. If, however,
externalities are strong enough, agents will increase leisure as well. The increase in leisure
will cause GDP to decline, and investment eventually falls. As the marginal product of
capital decreases with the decline in labor supply, the capital stock begins to fall. Reducing
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capital increases demand for labor. An alternative explanation of Benhabib and Farmer
(1994) arguments uses the non-standard slope of the labor demand curve. If the degree of
increasing returns to scale in the output production is high enough that the labor demand
curve slopes upward and more steeply than labor supply, any rise in labor demand shifts
the labor demand curve down and increases employment. Higher employment levels and less
capital both increase the marginal product of capital. With the new price of investment,
the economy will move to a new saddle path and a new equilibrium. In this case, the initial
saddle path becomes indeterminate with the change in agent beliefs.
2.3 The model
The previous section shows how indeterminacy arises in an RBC model with increasing
returns to scale in social production. In this section, we introduce our model with imple-
mentation labor, which can exhibit multiple equilibria with IRTS in the investment function.
Consider the following environment. A mass of identical agents, infinitely lived, maximize





βt(ln(ct)− φ(nf,t + ni,t)).
In the utility function, E0 is the expectations operator, β < 1 is the discount rate, and φ > 0
gauges the disutility of hours worked.
The representative agent also faces the following resource constraint:




where it is the investment, yt is the final good production, and vt represents the current
state of investment specific technology for producing investment goods (machinery and equip-
ment). The technology parameter vt determines the rate at which a unit of the final good can
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be converted to a unit of the investment good.7 An increase in vt reflects investment-specific
technological progress, and a decrease represents technological regress.
The final good is produced by the following Cobb-Douglas production function
yt = at(utkt)
αn1−αf,t (2.3)
where at is the TFP technology; ut is the rate of capacity utilization (endogenously deter-
mined by the representative firm); kt is the capital stock; and nf,t is labor hours used for
production. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] gauges the capital share of output, and 1-α is the labor
share (nf,t) of output.










The above law of motion for capital (2.4) is crucial to business cycle fluctuations. Here,
the endogenous rate of capital utilization is positively related to the depreciation of capital.
The depreciation rate is equal to
1
ϕ
uϕt with ϕ > 1. The specification ϕ > 1 means that more
intensive capital utilization accelerates the rate of depreciation. In addition, purchasing in-
vestment goods can more effectively add to capital stock when combined with separate labor
input, ni,t. Blankenau and Farah (2017) referred to this separate labor input as implemen-
tation labor. The term itn
θ
i,t where θ ≥ 0, represents the generalization of the law of motion
consistent with the discussion of implementation labor. Through this expression, increments
to the capital stock from investment depend upon how much labor is hired to implement
the investment. The parameter θ gauges the share of implementation services in producing
physical capital. Notice that when θ ≥ 0, capital production exhibits increasing returns to
scale in investment it and implementation labor ni,t. In our case, increasing returns to scale
in capital production differs from increasing returns to scale in the aggregate production
function in equation (2.1). Here, we attempt to discover whether and under what conditions
7This specification is similar to what can be found in Greenwood et al. (1997), Greenwood et al. (2000)
and Greenwood et al. (1988), and Ben Zeev and Khan (2015).
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do increasing returns in capital production cause indeterminate equilibria.
The total labor hours is defined as the combination of hours used for final good production
(nf,t) and implementing investment (ni,t).
nf,t + ni,t = nt. (2.5)
Finally, because not all investment expenditure is reflected in it, total output will not be
reflected in production of the final good. The value of output in this economy is the sum
of final goods production (our numeraire good) and the value of the services provided in
putting investment goods into production. In our model, labor will have the same wage,
wt, whether employed in final goods production or investment implementation. The value
of implementation services then will be equal to wtni,t, and total output is given by
Yt = yt + wni,t. (2.6)
The first order conditions for the representative agent are
c−1t = λt (2.7)































where λt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with equations, and λk,t is (2.4). Equations
(2.8) and (2.9) show the slope of household indifference curve to the marginal product of
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labor, equation (2.10) is the first order condition with respect to i, and equation (2.11) is
the euler equation for intertemporal consumption choices. Finally, equation (2.12) is the
marginal gain and marginal loss of a change in the rate of capital utilization ut. Equlibrium
in our model is represented by equations (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.11), (2.12), (2.4), and
(2.3).
2.4 Increasing returns to scale in the model
This section examines whether our model can generate increasing returns to scale in aggre-
gate production from the investment function in our model. Benhabib and Farmer (1994)
model shows strong increasing returns to scale in aggregate production and exhibiting in-
determinacy. Here we illustrate that implementation labor in capital production eventually
causes IRTS in final good production leading to multiple equilibria.




















































































































The above equation is analogous to equation (2.1). In looking at the equation (2.20) carefully,
we can see the shares of capital (kt) is
(ϕ− 1)α
ϕ− α




















As long as θ > 0 and ϕ > α, the aggregate output exhibits increasing returns to scale. In
our model, the share of implementation labor parameter θ must be greater than zero, and
the capacity utilization must be a convex function, so ϕ > 1. Moreover, the capital share
in final good production is α ∈ [0, 1], which is always less than capital utility parameter ϕ.
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In other words, the condition ϕ > α always holds. However, only IRTS in production does
not guarantee indeterminacy. The degree of ITRS must be high enough to produce sunspot
equilibria.
2.5 Conditions for indeterminacy
The RBC model in Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1999) exhibits constant returns to scale at
firm level production but increasing returns to scale at social aggregate production. Their
model shows that business cycles driven by self-fulfillment are possible with a higher degree of
IRTS. In the previous section, our model shows IRTS at the investment function eventually
leading to IRTS in the production function at the firm level. In our model, we also find
a threshold level of IRTS that can generate multiple equilibria. Our result is analogous
to Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1999).
2.5.1 Derivation of dynamic system of equations
In this section, the equilibrium conditions are reduced into two equations with one predeter-
mined variable (kt) and one non-predetermined variable (nf,t).









































Next, by substituting equations (2.18) and (2.19) into equations (2.9), (2.13), (2.22),
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Next, we substitute the values for λk,t and λk,t+1 from these equations and λt from (2.7)
into (2.24), (2.25), and (2.26) to get
φ =
θ(1− α)



































































) 1nθi,tvt . (2.34)














yt+1(θnf,t+1 − (1− α)ni,t+1)
















Now, by substituting these two equations into equation (2.28), we get































































α− ϕ . (2.41)











































































































Finally, equations (2.42) and (2.44) represent the reduced dynamic system of equations
in our model.




























































Finally, We use equations (2.45) and (2.46) to obtain the conditions for indeterminacy
in our model.
2.5.2 The steady states
We can find the steady-state values in our model using this reduced form system of equations
(2.45) and (2.46). First, we eliminate the time subscripts of all the variables because they
remain same across time in steady state. Second, all technologies remain same, so st = 1.



































1− x2 . (2.48)
The steady state values will be used to derive the conditions for indeterminacy in section
2.5.3.
2.5.3 Log linearization of reduced system of equations
The system of non-linear difference equations (2.45) and (2.46) does not have a closed form
solution. As such, the solution can be solved using approximation techniques. One partic-
ularly easy and very common approximation technique is log-linearization. First, we take
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the natural logs of the system of nonlinear difference equations. Then, we linearize the log
difference equations around a particular point (a steady state) and simplify until we have
a system of linear differential equations where the variables of interests are percentage de-
viations around the steady-state values. Linearization is crucial because it allows us to use
linear differential equations where the variables are percentage deviations from the steady
state. After taking the log of the non-linear equations, we do the first order Taylor series
expansion around the steady state and further simplify the equations to express percentage
deviations from steady state. We use ”tilde” to represent percentage deviations of the vari-
ables from their respective steady state values. The log-linearization of equations (2.45) and











q̃t + z̃t. (2.49)
q̃t+1 =









2.5.4 General conditions for indeterminacy
Benhabib and Farmer (1999) explain how the general conditions for indeterminacy can be
obtained from a log-linearized system of equations. Technically, indeterminacy in a dynamic
system comes from the explosive eigenvalues of a coefficient matrix. Following Benhabib and
Farmer (1999), suppose a dynamic system of equations can be written in the following form:
X̃t = ΩX̃t+1 + Γẽt+1. (2.51)
Now, rearranging the above equation gives
X̃t+1 = Ω
−1X̃t − Ω−1Γẽt+1 (2.52)
where Xt is a vector that contains endogenous variables found using Taylor series expansion
(log-linearizing) around the balanced growth path. Because the condition of indeterminacy
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is derived in the non-stochastic version of the model, here, et+1 is a null vector.
When some of the roots of Ω−1 lie outside the unit circle, equation (2.51) does not allow
us to construct the stochastic process of X̃t that gives rational expectation solutions. This
happens because equation (2.51) is not bounded and violates the transversality conditions
for the agent in the economy. As a result, equation (2.51) becomes explosive. To find a
determinate rational expectation model, we can eliminate the effect of explosive roots of
Ω−1 by putting restrictions on Xt. Suppose, for instance, vector X̃t is a combination of
two disjoint sets X̃1t and X̃
2
t . The dimension of X̃
1
t is n1 that contains the predetermined
variables in the model, and X̃2t is a dimension of n2 that contains the choice variables in
the model. Let λ be the roots of Ω, and it consists of two distinguished vectors: λ1 with a
dimension of m1 and λ2, with a dimension of m2. λ1 consists of the roots of outside the unit
circle, and λ2 consists of those inside the unit circle. The condition for a unique determinate
solution is that there are exactly the same numbers of non- predetermined variables as non-
explosive roots of Ω; in other words, n2 = m2. If there are fewer stable roots of Ω than
non-predetermined variables, we have the possibility of multiple indeterminate equilibria.
In a system of equations with one predetermined and one non-predetermined variable in
the log-linearized form (X̃t is a 2×2 matrix), let λ1 and λ2 be the eigenvalues of Ω−1. In order
to relate the indeterminate equilibria with the determinant and trace of a matrix, we consider
the derived conditions of indeterminacy from Barsky and Sims (2011), Eusepi (2009), Wen
(1998). According to Barsky and Sims (2011), there are two useful facts about eigenvalues
and determinants of a matrix. First, the determinant of a matrix is the multiplication of the
eigenvalues. Second, the trace of the matrix is the sum of the eigenvalues. Thus, we have
λ1λ2 = det|Ω−1|.
Now, rearranging the above equation gives
λ1 + λ2 = trace|Ω−1|.
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For indeterminate equilibria, both eigenvalues must be outside the unit circle. Because both
eigenvalues must be greater than one, then
(λ1 − 1) + (λ2 − 1) > 0.
(λ1 − 1) + (λ2 − 1) > 0.
Simplifying further, we have
λ1λ2 − λ1 − λ2 + 1 > 0.
λ1λ2 − (λ1 + λ2) > −1.
|trace|Ω−1| − det|Ω−1|| < 1. (2.53)
Equation (2.53) is the necessary and sufficient condition for the instability or indeterminate
equilibrium of a model.
2.5.5 Conditions for indeterminacy in our model
We now turn to the model presented in this paper to show the conditions under which the
model leads to indeterminacy. We show under what condition equation (2.53) is satisfied.



























Here we use the necessary and sufficient conditions for indeterminacy as stated in equation
(2.53). The conditions for indeterminacy depend on the eigenvalues of matrix M. Indeter-
minacy occurs when both eigenvalues of M are outside the unit circle.
The necessary and sufficient conditions require
|trace(M)− det(M)| < 1. (2.54)





























































(Aα +Bα + C
ϕ
β
(1− α)(1− β). (2.57)
The above equation is the necessary and sufficient condition for indeterminacy in our model.
2.6 Intuition of results
Using the preceding analysis, this section intuitively explains sunspot equilibrium in our
model. The implementation labor share θ must be between (0,
1
2ϕ




α)(1 − β)) for the steady state to be saddle path stable or in unique equilibrium. When
the implementation labor share of investment function is high enough (θ >
1
2ϕ




(1− α)(1− β)), the economy exhibits an infinite number of equilibria.
Intuiting the existence of indeterminacy in our model is straightforward. Consider start-
ing with an equilibrium trajectory of investment, output, and consumption. The agents
become optimistic about the future development of the economy and inquire whether ad-
ditional accumulation of capital can be justified as a new equilibrium. However, a new
equilibrium path requires a higher return on investment. If the higher anticipated stock of
capital increases marginal product of capital by raising the demand for labor, the expected
higher rate of return on investment will be self-fulfilling.
In our model, when the agents become optimistic about future returns on investment,
firms accumulate capital at a faster rate and the demand for implementation labor rises.
The workers also become confident about market returns on labor because of higher demand
and decide to work harder. To justify such optimism, a higher interest rate and higher
wages are necessary. If increasing returns to scale induced by the investment function in
the capital production result in higher capital and labor productivity, then the competitive
firm will accumulate more capital and pay a higher wage. As a result, firm and household
expectation of higher returns on investment and labor productivity become self-fulfilling.
Because infinitely many saddle paths (that depend on the returns of investment and wage)
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exist, through which the economy converges to a unique equilibrium, the initial equilibrium
path becomes indeterminate. That is how a model with increasing returns to scale and with
implementation labor leads to sunspot equilibria or becomes an indeterminate model.
Our analytical results indicate that the magnitude of returns to scale is critical for gener-
ating indeterminacy in our model. In fact, only when increasing returns to scale is not enough
for self-fulfilling driven business cycles is a sufficiently strong return to scale necessary. In
our model, firms internalize increasing returns to scale through increasing demand for im-
plementation labor. Without implementation labor, the model cannot generate increasing
returns to scale, and the economy will not be driven by self-fulfilling beliefs.
2.7 Conclusion
We have built a model Blankenau and Farah (2017) that captures news driven business
cycles through complementarity between investment and labor input. In essence, a news
shock influences the demand for labor used to implement new investment capital and capital
utilization. Labor used for implementation enhances capital utilization but has no impact on
current production. Our model, which includes implementation labor, capacity utilization,
and adjustment cost of investment, can reproduce news-driven business cycles.
In a special case, our model exhibits increasing returns to scale in the investment func-
tion, which causes an indeterminate set of equilibria. Our non-stochastic version of the model
with market imperfection (IRTS) is supported by stationary rational expectation that may
be driven by sunspots. The following argument indicates that a representative agent allows
self-fulfilling expectation with significant influence on the dynamics of macroeconomic vari-
ables. Our paper explores the conditions under which indeterminacy of equilibrium occurs in
a representative agent model with implementation labor. Our main finding is that a certain
higher level of the share of implementation labor in the production of capital may cause
indeterminacy. We interpret this as follows: when an agent expects (purely driven by extrin-
sic belief) to have higher returns on investment and labor, a significant degree of increasing
returns to scale of investment justifies the higher demand for investment, labor, and higher
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wages. In this case, different beliefs lead to different equilibrium paths and converge to the
steady state.
In the literature of expectation business cycles, local indeterminacy, which may drive the
force of fluctuations, is the self-fulfilling belief of the agents. Guo et al. (2015) and Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2009) published significant papers on the news-driven business cycle; these pa-
pers assume a unique saddle path and steady state equilibrium while mentioning the possibil-
ity of having indeterminate equilibrium. In this project, we first show that a representative
agent model with implementation labor can exhibit increasing returns to scale. Increasing
returns to scale cause the model to be indeterminate of first generation sort under some
parametrizations. In this case, business cycle fluctuations can be caused by self-fulfilling
beliefs. In other cases, news shocks can yield business cycle behavior based on a unique
self-belief about future fundamentals. Because the root cause of business cycles is distinct in
the two cases, we must understand situations where indeterminacy can arise. In this paper,
we identify parameter values that lead to potential indeterminacy in a special case of the
model we will introduce in the first paper.
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Chapter 3
Declining price of computer capital,




The U.S. labor market has seen strong job polarization since the late 1980s.2 According
to David et al. (2006), changes in technology, particularly in computerization, allows rou-
tine cognitive tasks like office, clerical, administration, to be done more efficiently, while
complementing highly skilled labor like problem-solving and interactive tasks. So, we see an
increase in the relative demand for jobs requiring highly skilled labor and a decline in the rel-
ative demand for routine jobs. David and Dorn (2013) argue that the increase in production
of goods requiring highly skilled labor is connected to a rise in demand for services requir-
ing low-skilled labor. Thus, highly skilled workers with higher earnings need other services
1This chapter is a joint work with Dr. Blankenau. I developed the idea and wrote the paper. Dr.
Blankenau helped me building the model and coding.
2Existing literature defines ”job polarization” as the growth of employment of low-skilled workers who
perform manual labor accompanied by growing employment of highly skilled workers (who perform specific
tasks) and by declining employment of workers in the middle who perform routine tasks (Goos and Manning,
2003).
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like assistance in caring for others, babysitting, food service, security, janitorial service, dry
cleaning, hairdressers, etc. As a result, employment and wages have gone up in occupations
requiring lower levels of skill. David et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence of such employ-
ment changes in the United States since the late 1980s that are strongly U-shaped in skill
level. Simultaneously, wage growth is also U-shaped in the skill percentiles David and Dorn
(2013).
Existing literature focuses on skilled-biased technological change and explicates the de-
mand side of the labor market to show how job polarization is associated with the demand
for skilled labor. A very few studies link the supply side to labor market polarization. In
one important work, Goldin and Katz (2007) find that the demand for and supply of skilled
labor have expanded disproportionately since the late 1980s. While demand for skilled labor
has been increasing fairly consistently, the relative growth in the supply of skilled labor fell
short of the growth in demand.
In this paper, we focus on two things. First, we show that wage polarization can be
modeled as the result of the lower price of computer capital. In other words, wage growth
is strong for relatively low and high-income groups but declines for middle-income workers.3
Secondly, we look at both the demand and supply of the labor market and analyze how
wage polarization affects time allocation in providing different types of skills among workers.
Primarily, we consider whether the lower price of computer capital reduces growth in the
earnings of workers with relative aptitude in routine labor and whether workers would benefit
by attending college to gain skills. When skill accumulation is strongly associated with
educational attainment, we hypothesize that the lack of demand and wage stagnation of
routine labor discourages some agents from acquiring a college education. We base our
research question on evidence of the slowing growth rate in college-educated workers despite
high returns on education (Goldin and Katz, 2007).
We develop a general equilibrium model where an individual chooses when to provide
three different types of skills: manual labor skill, routine labor skill, and abstract labor skill.
3In our analysis wage growth means how much the wage increases/decrease due to reduced price of
computer capital.
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The choice should maximize the market value of their time allocation. The productivity
of routine and abstract skills for each agent are drawn from a log-normal distribution; all
workers provide each type of skill but in different proportions. Those with relative aptitude
in abstract ability tend to supply more abstract skill, and this is true for the other skills
as well. In our model, we assume that a business uses all types of skills but at different
intensities. For example, manual labor skill is less productive, but a business uses it for
low-skilled tasks. Also, this type of skill is a complement to computer capital. Routine
labor skill is necessary for tasks like clerical, administrative, and mechanical tasks, which
requires middle level skills. We assume computer capital as a substitute for routine labor
skill. Consequently, these types of skills face the potential risk of devaluation as technology
improves. However, abstract skill is more productive; it complements technology and thus
used most rigorously in managerial and professional tasks that require highly skilled labor.
In our model, agents are heterogeneous with a productivity portfolio by nature and with
increased supplies of skills through education. Attaining education involves financial costs
and time. The trade off faced by an individual is whether a portfolio of abilities assigned
by nature and the cost of accumulating skills through education is repaid by higher labor
productivity in the future.
In our model, technological advancement is captured by reducing the price of computers
following David and Dorn (2013).4 A technological improvement increases the efficiency of
computer capital through lower prices. Computer capital takes the place of routine labor,
which causes the business to reduce demand for routine labor skill. With lower demand,
wages for routine skill labor falls. However, demand for abstract and manual labor rise
because they complement computer capital. Thus it increases wages for these skills.
We argue that if an agent’s lifetime income is higher with a college education, she will
pursue a college degree. That is, if income from attending school is more than the cost
associated with education and income tax, the agent will attend college. In our analysis,
all human capital production exhibits diminishing marginal product of skill. In the face
4This specification is also found in Greenwood et al. (1997), Greenwood et al. (2000), and Ben Zeev and
Khan (2015).
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of wage polarization and subsequently reduced wages for routine labor, if an individual’s
natural proclivities for manual and abstract skills are not high enough to cover fixed college
costs, then the individual will not attend college. Otherwise, if the income for manual and
abstract skills is high enough to cover the cost (even as routine labor income decreases), the
agent will choose to attend college. Overall, we find that a 1% decrease in computer prices
will reduce college attendance by 0.22%. In equilibrium, because of endogenous prices of
different labor inputs, workers with high abstract skill ability tend to be at the highest level
of income distribution, people with relatively higher manual skills are at the lower end of
income distribution, and people who do routine intensive work are in the middle of income
distribution.
Goldin and Katz (2007) note evidence that supply has expanded less smoothly than
demand. However, the existing literature does not provide any structural interpretation of
the dynamics of this change. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to model
the structural dynamics of technological change and include the supply of skilled labor that
explains wage polarization and education attainment. Our analysis explains why the high
skill labor supply has slowed over the last few decades. Our study provides some insight into
information gathered in surveys of employers by the National at Federation of Independent
Business (Madigan, 2015). In these surveys, many business owners and trade associations
complain about the lack of skilled workers for hire, especially as the labor market recovers
from the recent recession. Why might all of this happen? Our analysis indicates that labor
market polarization changes the pattern of skill supplies in the labor market. Individuals with
relative aptitude at routine skills are reluctant to go to college because wages for manual and
abstract skill are relatively higher than wages for routine skill. As a result, the relative supply
of routine skill workers has declined. Our model replicates the situation where technological
change reduces college attendance and hence the supply of skilled labor.
In this chapter, we present the model in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we define the
equilibrium in the model. Section 3.4 provides our numerical analysis, and Section 3.5
describes the results. In Section 3.6, we provide our conclusions. The solutions in the model
are in the Appendix C.
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3.2 The model
We use a general equilibrium model where agents live three periods and are heterogeneous
in productivity assigned by nature. We assume all agents are high school graduates. In
the first period, agents allocate time to supply different types of skill and end the period as
young workers. In the second period, they work as adults, and, in the third period, they
retire and then die. Those who go to college increase their productivity in all skills by a fixed
efficiency unit . The opportunity cost of going to college is the time allocated for increasing
the efficiency of human capital. Also, the financial cost is the tuition cost. Individuals
decide on a college education and accumulate time to gain human capital. The first choice is
whether or not to go to college. Second, given the option of educational attainment, an agent
can choose how much of each type of skill to supply. The decision is based on comparing
lifetime income with and without college.
The firms produces aggregate output that is determined by two types of capital stock:
general capital (Kg) and computer capital (Kr) as well as the stock of three kinds of labor
input: manual labor (M), routine labor (R), and abstract labor (A). All workers supply
manual labor, routine labor, and abstract labor. However, agents with the relative aptitude
to manual productivity (zM) supply more manual skill (hM), agents with the corresponding
proficiency to routine productivity (zR) provide more routine labor (hR), and agents with
relative talent for abstract productivity (zA) supply more abstract labor (hA). Manual
labor involves low skilled tasks like driving and cleaning, which require minimal creative
and cognitive skill. Routine labor performs tasks that need clerical and the usual analytical
skills and require medium skill. These types of employment involve repetitive work like
calculating, coordinating, data analysis, and keeping records. Abstract labor uses creativity,
generalized problem solving, and complex communication for tasks that demand cognitive
and interpersonal skill. General capital is defined as infrastructure, machinery, and other
physical capital. We assume that computer capital (information technology) only fulfills
routine tasks.
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We write aggregate output as
Y = F (M,R,A;Kr, Kg). (3.1)
Because we consider only steady state values in our model, no time subscript is included
in the variables. We assume that Kr, M , R, A, and Kg are endogenously determined
by technological change. Technological innovation is measured using the falling price of
computer capital and is the exogenous driving force in our model.
Computers take over jobs requiring routine skills, reducing demand for workers who
supply relatively high routine labor and reducing wages for routine labor. On the other
hand, computer capital complements abstract skills and manual skills. The productivity
(wages) of abstract and manual labor rise because of high demand for them.
The government provides subsidies for those who enroll in college and balances its budget
through income tax.
3.2.1 Firm decisions
The representative firm produces output using the following technology:
Y = Kθkg M
θmAθa [ΦRµ + (1− Φ)Kµr ]
1− θk − θm − θa
µ .
where, θk, θm, θa, µ ∈ (0, 1), and
θk + θm + θa ≤ 1.
Φ represents the weight on work activities of routine labor in the production process.
All three types of labor, manual, routine, and abstract, are imperfectly substituted. We
assume computer capital (Kr) is relatively complementary to general capital (Kg), manual
labor (M), and abstract labor (A) and a relative substitute for routine labor. The elasticity





. In our model we consider the value of µ to be between 0 and 1 so routine labor
(R) and computer capital (Kr) can substitute for each other. The elasticity of substitution
between total routine task input and manual labor (M), abstract labor (A), or general capital
(Kg) is one.
Computer capital is supplied at market price Pt. Here, the time subscript of price in-
dicates higher versus lower price of capital. Because our model captures no dynamics, we
study the steady-state situation at different prices. Following David and Dorn (2013) The
exogenous driving force in our model is the decline in the price of computer capital due to
technological changes. The falling prices of computers replaces routine labor and reduces
the wages of this skill group. On the other hand, computer capital increases utilization of
abstract labor and general capital. The compensation for abstract ability also then rises,
and this upsurge increases the demand for manual skill in the production process. No de-
preciation of capital is used in our model, so the net stock of capital is equal to total savings
in the economy.
The firm maximizes profits and pays according to the marginal product of all inputs.
The manual labor wage, routine labor wage, and abstract labor wage are represented as ωM ,
ωR, ωA, and the rental rates of general capital and computer capital are rkg , rkr .
The firm’s objective function is given below:
max
{M,R,A,Kr,Kg}
(Y − (ωMM + ωRR + ωAA+ rkrKr + rkgKg))
subject to,
Y = Kθkg M
θmAθa [ΦRµ + (1− Φ)Kµr ]
1− θk − θm − θa
µ . (3.2)
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(1− Φ)(1− θk − θm − θa)Y
(K1−µr [ΦRµ + (1− Φ)Kµr ]
. (3.7)






There are N heterogeneous agents in the economy. Agents are heterogeneous by nature
on productivity endowments (zM,j, zR,j, zA,j) in all three types of skills (manual, routine,
and abstract). We assume each agent has a draw for routine (zR,j) and abstract (zA,j)
productivity assigned by nature from a log-normal distribution and inherits manual skill as
zM,j = 1. Agents live for three periods as a young, adult, and old agent and maximizes
income over a lifetime. More specifically, agents, indexed by j, are born in the first period,
acquire human capital, and end the period as a young worker. In the second period, agents
work and retire at the end of the period. In the third period, agents live on their savings
and exit the economy. Different inherent abilities, human capital accumulation costs, and
wage structure in the economy motivate agents to allocate time for acquiring human capital
portfolios 5. Here portfolio means different compositions of three types of skill.
We assume that all agents are high school graduates and choose whether to attend college.
The choice of supply depends on individual ability and the employment situation in the
economy. However, the human capital portfolio can be improved by acquiring a college
degree. A college degree raises human capital of each type by an efficiency unit (η).
In the first period, an agent decides whether to attend college (H = 1) or not (H = 0),
current consumption (C1), savings (S1) and time allocation (tM , tR, tR). If they go to college,
the spend tc < 1 unit of time for education and 1-tc unit of time for work in the first period
5The term is used in Silos and Smith (2015).
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of life. In the second period of life, they only work and devote 1 unit of time to working.
On the other hand, if they do not attend college, they have 1 unit of time to work in both
of the periods of life. Also, They begin life with a portfolio of productivities zM,j, zR,j, zA,j,
wage structure of different skill types ωM , ωR, ωA, and a unit of time. For this presentation,
we drop the individual specification j.
In the second period, agents choose consumption (C2), and savings (S2). In the third
period, the agent only consumes (C3) and expires.
The agents’ problem can be broken into three separate sub-problems. First is the income
allocation, then the next two choices maximize income. First, they choose the time allocation
to supply different types of skill and second, they decide whether to attend college or not to
maximize lifetime income.
3.2.3 Utility maximization problem
We first consider the utility maximization problem of the agents.












C1 + S1 = I1.
C2 + S2 = I2 + rS1.
C3 = rS2.
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and σ > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion. Here, H
is an indicator variable. H being 1 indicates somebody chooses college education otherwise
H = 0 indicates she will not.
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3.2.4 Income allocation problem






















3.2.5 Time allocation problem
Now, agents decide how to allocate time providing skills to maximize lifetime income. We
solve this separately for those who go to college and those who do not.
The agent’s income in each period depends on the choice to attend college. The income in
the first period I1 will be determined by this college decision, the acquired units of different
human capital stocks, and the remuneration per unit.
If an agent does not attend college (H = 0), his human capital accumulation follows
hM = zM t
α







where tM , tR, tA are time spent in acquiring manual, routine, abstract human capital and
1 = tM + tR + tA.
Remuneration per unit of human capital will be ωM , ωR, and ωA, which are determined
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by the equilibrium dynamics of the economy. The total income in the first period of life will
be
I1 = (ωMhM + ωRhR + ωAhA)(1− T ). (3.9)
In the second period of life, years of experience in work (γ > 1) affects income. The
present value of a high school graduate’s income will be
I2 = (ωMhM + ωRhR + ωAhA)
γ
rk
(1− T ). (3.10)
If the agent chooses to go to college (H = 1), he allocates tc fraction of time to acquire a
college degree. Also, each type of human capital accumulation will increase by an efficiency
unit (η) for attending college. The human capital will accumulate according to









where η > 0. Thus
1− tc = tM + tR + tAη.
Other than human capital stock and prevailing wage structure, agent income in the first
period also depends on government subsidies for educational expenditures (Gs), exogenous
tuition cost (X) to acquire college degree, and income tax (T ). Hence, the total income of
a college-going agent in the first period (I1) will be
I1 = (ωMhM + ωRhR + ωAhA)(1− tc)η(1− T )− (1−Gs)X. (3.11)
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The present value of the second-period income of a college educated agent will be
I2 = (ωMhM + ωRhR + ωAhA)
γη
rk
(1− T ). (3.12)

















1 = tM + tR + tA
if H = 0
Again the constraints are









1− tc = tM + tR + tA
if H = 1. Here the agent spends tc units of time attending college.












If H=0, then the time constraint both in the first and second period of life is
1 = tM + tR + tA.
If H=1, the time constraint for the first period of life is
1− tc = tM + tR + tA.
Moreover, in the second period of life, the time constraint is
1 = tM + tR + tA.
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The second period solutions for college-educated workers are same as in equations (3.20),
(3.21) and (3.20).
3.2.6 College decision problem
Finally agents decide whether go to college or not as follows.
The lifetime income for those attending college Ic is







The lifetime income for those not attending college Inc is







An agent will choose to go to college if lifetime income after attending college is higher than
lifetime income without attending college. We rewrite the college decision as















The left hand side (L.H.S) of the above equation is agents’ income after attending college
which depends on the endogenous wage of each skill and the human capital portfolio of every
agent (hM , hR, hM). The portfolio is determined by an agent’s time allocation and natural
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endowment she inherits for each skill. Note that, any change in the price of computer capital
affects the wage of each skill consequently, makes a difference to the L.H.S. of equation (3.25).
Similarly, the right hand side (R.H.S) is the cost of attending college which is affected by
government policies on subsidy and income tax. A subsidy reduces the cost of attending
college where an income tax increases it. As a result, any government intervention change
the threshold cost of attending college hence the R.H.S. of equation (3.25) is affected.
3.2.7 Government expenditures
The government provides subsidies to every individual going to college, financing the expen-
diture through the income tax collected from workers. The budget constraint satisfies
GsXNc = TY. (3.26)
where Gs is the share of tuition cost subsidized by the government, X is the tuition cost,
Nc is the number of people attending college, T is the tax rate, and Y is total income in the
economy.
3.3 Definition of equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium in this environment is a set of quantities {c1,j, c2,j, c3,j, s1,j, s2,j},
college choices, time allocations in each period of life, human capital accumulation {hM,j, hR,j, hA,j}
chosen by agents; the set of individual natural productivity {zM,j, zR,j, zA,j} all taken as given
by a set of outputs and inputs chosen by the representative firm in each period {Yt, Kr,t, Kg,t};
a set of prices {ωM , ωR, ωA, rr, rg}; and government policy {Gs, T}. Each is such that it sat-
isfies the following conditions:
1. the individual decides on college attendance based on maximizing expected lifetime
income and also chooses {ct, ct+1, ct+2, st+1, st+2, tM , tR, tA}, taking prices and a set
of natural productivity {zM,j, zR,j, zA,j} as given;
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2. the firm chooses Yt, Kr, Kg,M,R and A in period t to maximize profits, taking prices
as given;














5. the goods market clears; and
6. the government balances its budget constraint.
3.4 Results
In this section, we discuss the results in our model. First, we show that our model replicates
wage polarization as find in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Next, we discuss how wage polar-
ization affects the supply of human capital and the agent decision about attending college
in our model. Finally, government tax policy on college attendance is analyzed. We use
the following parameter values in our model simulation. The share of manual skill (θm) is
0.1, abstract skill (θa) is 0.4, and general capital (θk) is 0.2. The elasticity of substitution
parameter µ is 0.5, the share of routine skill in production φ is 0.2, risk aversion is 0.5, the
discount rate β is 0.7, the efficiency parameter η is 1.2, the experience parameter γ is 1, the
tuition cost X is 0.2, the time needed to attend college tc is 0.15, tax is 0.05, and the human
capital accumulation parameter α is 0.5.
3.4.1 Wage polarization
Figure 3.1 illustrates the wage polarization of our model. First, we choose a price of computer
capital and solve the model. In the process, we find the lifetime income of all the agents and
sort lifetime incomes into percentiles. Next, we take the average income of all individuals in
each decile and draw the income distribution. In this procedure we find the distribution of
lifetime income when the price of computer capital is relatively high. Then holding all other
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parameters the same, we repeat the procedure to find the income distribution when computer
capital costs less. Further, we take the logarithm of each earning distribution and compare
the change in income for each decile attributable to changes in computer capital price. We
define this income change as log difference of average earning. The X-axis denotes income
percentile ranked between 0 and 1 using the percentile of agent lifetime income, and the
Y-axis is the log difference of average earning. The graph illustrates how the distribution of
lifetime income changes due to changes in computer price. Our model replicates the pattern
of wage polarization that Acemoglu et al. (2012) find empirically.6
Figure 3.1: The growth rate of lifetime income for change in computer capital price.
In looking at Figure 3.1 carefully, we can see the earning growth pattern is non-monotone
in income percentile. Consistent with the conventional view of technological change and
wage polarization, our model reflects that wage growth is U-shaped. The wage gain is
relatively high at the lower deciles then gradually slows, so the wage growth is negative
for a segment of the middle-income group. The wage growth picks up again in the upper
tails. Intuitively, when technological change reduces computer prices, the representative firm
6 Acemoglu et al. (2012) uses empirical data to define wage polarization. They consider income growth
as changes in hourly wages relative to changes in median wages by earning percentile. In our model, we
calculate the lifetime income of all the agents and define the income percentile by low, middle, and high
income.
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increases the stock of computer capital and reduces demand for routine skill. As computers
replace labor for routine tasks, productivity of routine skill falls due to the increase in the
substitute input. On the other hand, the technological change makes manual and abstract
skill-intensive production more necessary. In turn, the demand for and productivity of both
types of skills goes up.
In equilibrium, an agent who is naturally more productive in routine tasks tends to supply
relatively more routine labor in the labor market, an agent with relative aptitude in abstract
skill tends to provide more abstract labor, and a comparable worker using manual skills






> 1 shows falling
wages for labor using routine skills mostly affects workers with relatively high productivity
in routine tasks or the middle-income group. On the other hand, the rising productivity
of labor using manual and abstract abilities means low income and high income groups are
better off. In our simulated model, the wage growth rate is higher for the low-income group
than the high-income group. The returns on skills are endogenized in our model through the
dynamics of general equilibrium. Hence, the parameters θm and θa are vital in determining
wage growth in our model.
3.4.2 Education choice
Our second key finding focuses on the decision to attend college. In particular, we show how
non-monotonic earning growth or wage polarization affects the decision to attend college.
We compute the expected earnings of agents who attend and agents who do not. The trade
off between “attending” and “not attending” college depends on the expected return on
education, financial costs, and individual productivity endowments.
An agent will choose to go to college if lifetime income after attending college is higher
than lifetime income without attending college. That is if the L.H.S. of equation (3.25) is
greater than the R.H.S. the agent will attend college, otherwise not.
In our model, all agents inherit and supply all types of skills, but their relative aptitudes
varies. Also, an agent with relative abundance of routine skills tends to supply more routine
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skill in the labor market; the same applies to manual and abstract skills.
Note that agent lifetime expected earnings and agent decisions about going to college
are connected to the relative price of computer capital. A lower price for technology affects
each individual agent differently because the effect depends on the individual portfolio. The
price change on the lifetime earnings are mainly affected by two things. First, changes in the
price of computer capital reduce routine labor wages (ωR). Second, those changes increase
the salaries for manual ωR labor and increases the wages of labor using manual (ωM) and
abstract (ωA) skills. For some people, the downward impact dominates, so they choose not
to attend college. These people are close to the cut off threshold for the benefits of going
to college. On the other hand, for others, the upward impact dominates, so the agent will
attend college.
To illustrate, when the wages for routine skill drops due to lower computer capital price,
some agents whose lifetime incomes are at the break-even margin and thus are close to
the cut off threshold for the benefits of going to college; these agents likely will not choose
to attend college if they are relatively efficient at providing routine labor. So people who
have a relative abundance of routine skills and low manual and abstract skills do not find
it advantageous to go to the college, making it reasonable to choose not to attend college
because their return from routine skill trends down, especially if, in addition, the income
from manual and routine labor is not high enough to cover the tax, tuition cost, and time
needed to pursue a college education. On the other hand, some of the agents at the margin
may have low R but high A andM . These people are more likely to pursue college as their
income after going college exceeds the cost.
The dynamics can be better understood by looking at equation (3.25), where the LHS
reflects the benefit of attending college and the RHS is the cost. If RHS is greater than LHS,
agents opt out of attending college. However, if agent income from manual and abstract
skill is high enough to cover the fixed costs of going to college, agents with relative aptitude
in routine skill may still attend college. In that case, their income after attending college is
higher than their income with no college degree even though the return on routine skill falls.
The net benefit of attending college depends on which factor works more strongly. Overall,
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we find that a 1% decrease in the price of computer capital reduces college attendance by
0.22% in our model.
Our analysis reveals that the recent wage structure in the U.S. economy inherently affects
human capital accumulation. Technological change affects wage growth of workers with
different relative incomes, accentuating income inequality7. Thus, in turn, affects the decision
to attend college. Our analysis is similar to Goldin and Katz (2007), who state ”... changes
in the rate of expansion in the supply of skills explain more of the variance in inequality over
time than demand does”. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to show how
wage polarization and technological advancement affect the supply side of the labor market
and individual decisions about attending college.
3.5 Government subsidy policy
This section illustrates the policy implications of our model. In particular, we want to
examine how subsidies change lifetime income across income distribution. In addition, we
analyze the effects of government subsidies on college education. Against the backdrop of
wage polarization and the subsequent decline in rates of college attendance, we want to
investigate whether a subsidy could encourage college enrollment and how the distribution
of income is affected. Agents college decision after subsidy depends on the dynamics between
reduced education cost, the increase in income tax and the general equilibrium adjustment
of wages. Our analysis indicates that a 0.5% increase in income tax rises college attendance
by 8%. In particular, we show that 60% of people attend college when no tax or subsidy is
available. The attendance rate increases to 68% in the presence of 0.5% income tax.
First, we set the price of technology as one (P = 1), with no tax or subsidy provided by
the government (T=0). After solving the model, we find the lifetime income of all agents
and sort lifetime income by percentile. Next, we take the average income of all individuals in
each percentile and draw an income distribution to find the distribution of lifetime income
when the government provides no subsidy. Then holding all the other parameters the same,
7Similar to Autor (2014).
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we repeat the procedure to find the income distribution for a positive tax level (T = 0.05).
Further, we take the logarithm of each earning distribution and compare changes in income
for each decile due to changes in government compensation. In Figure 3.2, the X-axis denotes
income percentile ranked between 0 and 1 by taking the percentile of agent lifetime incomes,
and the Y-axis is the change in lifetime income due to government subsidy. The inverse U
shape curve shows the income difference in each situation. We use the parameter values
from the previous section, keeping the price constant at Pt = 1.
Figure 3.2: The growth rate of lifetime income for change in government subsidy.
To understand the result we again refer to equation (3.25). The RHS of equation (3.25)
is the threshold cost of attending the college, and the LHS is the income of an individual at-
tending college. Now, suppose the government provides an education subsidy (Gs) consisting
of a fraction of total tuition cost (X). The government policy affects the economy in three
ways: i) increase in tax for all; ii) provide a subsidy for some; iii) changes in wages. Note
that the government policy influences the relative supply of labor inputs. Consequently, the
equilibrium wages for different skill groups change due to general equilibrium adjustments.
People who are college goers tend to supply more abstract and routine skills compared to the
manual skill. The equilibrium wage change reflects these dynamics. In our analysis, we find
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that an increase in subsidy reduces the equilibrium wage of abstract skill (ωA) and routine
skill (ωR) and increases manual skill wage (ωM).
An agent will choose college if lifetime income after government subsidy and wage changes
is higher than the income tax and tuition cost. That is the R.H.S. of equation (3.25) is greater
than the L.H.S. of (3.25). The subsidy reduces the threshold cost of attending college (R.H.S.
of equation (3.25) ) and thus encourages more people to attend college. Boosting education
subsidies is, however, a double-edged sword for agent lifetime earnings. The income of agents
depends on what kind of ability individuals have and the market rate of those skills. The
subsidies increase lifetime earnings for some agents but also increases tax burdens. The lower
cost of education due to subsidy has both direct and indirect positive effects on agent lifetime
earnings. The lower cost itself increases the income directly, and, at the same time, agents
earn higher wages with a college degree. However, because tax revenue finances subsidies,
agents will incur higher taxes on their income. Note that the government provides a fixed
subsidy only to those people who attend college, whereas it imposes a proportional tax across
the board. Thus, the net effect on the RHS is lower because the percentage increase in tax
is lower than the percentage increase in subsidy. In equilibrium, taxes and subsidies level
off. Only a segment of the people, those who attend college, benefits because of the lower
cost of education.
So far we see the growth in earning percentile for low and high-income groups whereas the
middle-income group witnesses a growth in earning. The economic intuition that increasing
education subsidies increases college enrollment can be argued as follows. Assume three
different characteristics among individuals: (i) individuals who always go to college regardless
of government policy; (ii) individuals who opt to go to college when there is a subsidy for
college education; and (iii) individuals who never go to college. Further, we can loosely
assume that most of the individuals who have always intended to go to college regardless of
government policy belong to a higher income group and most of the individuals who never
intend to go to college belong to low-income groups. The college decision of individuals
with these characteristics are not affected by government policy on education subsidies. We
cannot expect much increase or decrease in college enrollment among these two groups of
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people.
To understand how government policy affects different income groups, let us examine
Figure 3.2 more closely. Figure 3.2 shows the log difference of average earnings before and
after a subsidy. People in the low and high-income group show negative wage growth due to
increased tax because the subsidy is financed by the income tax collected from the agents
regardless of income level. To get a more in-depth understanding, let us follow the income
group from left to right on the horizontal axis. The income change is negative between 0 to
approximately 30 percentile. People belong to this income group hardly go to the college.
They do not get any benefit from the subsidy. Though their equilibrium wage changes,
the proportionate tax burden causes relatively a sizeable negative impact on their lifetime
income.
The middle-income group experience a positive income growth over the lifetime. It mainly
because people on the margin, who was indecisive about going to the college, now go to college
due to the subsidy. These people are mostly at the margin of 30 to 45 percentile of the income
distribution. As the threshold of cost decreases because of government subsidies, some people
at the cut-off point will choose to attend college. The higher enrollment from the margin
increases the overall lifetime earnings of the middle-income growth. After college, their
efficiency gain will give them a higher return on income than the taxes they pay. Also, the
net effect of the tax on the lifetime earnings is small because this group is directly benefited
from the subsidy. Finally, we do not see any significant changes in college enrollment decision
from the high-income group (roughly ten percentile). However, their lifetime income growth
becomes negative mainly because of a high tax burden.
Overall, most of the individuals who always choose college are better off due to govern-
ment subsidy. However, individuals at the 90 percentile of the earnings distribution are worse
off as they pay higher tax and receive lower wages from abstract and routine skill. Similarly,
individuals at the 30 percentile of the earnings receive lower income due to the income tax.
Note that most of the people in this income group do not attend college so they never receive
any subsidies. However, some individuals within this group may find their earnings to go up
with the changes in wages. Also, we can reasonably assume that individuals whose college
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decisions are affected by government support mostly come from the middle-income group.
Next, we consider how changes in tax structure affect the economy’s gross and net income.
We find that if the government increases the tax by 0.05%, in aggregate the net income
of all the agents falls by 0.18%. Though all the individuals are required to pay income
tax regardless of attending college or not, the government policy does not affect all the
individuals equally. As argued previously the lower and upper-income group are negatively
affected by the policy while the middle-income people are the primary beneficiary. Overall,
the net income goes down. The lower income leads the total consumption to decrease. The
overall net activities of the economy see a downward trend. However, this downtrend is offset
by the increase in government expenditure. We find that the government policy increases
the gross income by 0.71%. However, the increase in output is offset by increase in the
education expenditure so that the consumption goes down. In summary, the government
subsidy helps to redistribute income towards the middle-income group at the cost of lower
and higher income groups. In the process, the total output in the economy increases while
the net income falls due to income tax.
The policy implication from the above exercise is that the government can help the
middle-income group, those who are hurt by the reduction of computer capital price and
pull out from the college, by providing a subsidy for education, thus, increasing the rate of
college attendance in this group. Also, government subsidy causes an increase in the gross
income of the economy.
3.6 Conclusion
The primary objective of our paper is to develop a model that displays wage polarization
using empirical data. We built a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents char-
acterized by different productivity endowments. We considered two types of capital, namely,
general capital and computer capital, and three types of labor inputs. Manual labor is used
for low productivity tasks; routine labor involved assisting with repetitive tasks, and abstract
labor used creativity in tasks that demanded high cognitive and interpersonal skill. Gen-
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eral capital is infrastructure, machinery, and other physical capital, and computer capital is
computer equipment or information technology that performs only routine tasks. Computer
capital replaces routine labor and complements abstract labor, manual labor, and general
capital. In our model, the reduction of the price of computer capital is the exogenous factor
that changes returns for different kinds of labor. Notably, low computer prices reduced wages
for routine labor, increased returns for manual and abstract labor. The agents in our model
are heterogeneous in their ability to supply different types of labor: manual, routine, and
abstract. All individuals are high school graduates who decided whether to attend college.
In addition, every individual supplied all types of labor at varying capacities. Those who
are relatively more talented in routine tasks tended to supply more routine labor, with the
same applying to manual and abstract labor.
Our model produces U-shaped wage growth for income distribution in the lifetime earn-
ings of agents. That is, when the price of computer capital decline, our model show that
wages grew for the lower and upper-income groups and decreased for the middle-income
group. Then we show how wage polarization affects human capital accumulation, especially
in the decision of heterogeneous agents to attend college . The college decision depends on
individual ability; the wages prevailing in the economy, and tuition and time costs associ-
ated with college education. If the income of those attending college is higher over an agents
lifetime than the income of agents without a college education, an agent should choose to
go to college. The lower wages for routine labor because of changes in computer capital
price discourage agents who have more routine skills as well as fewer manual and abstract
skills from attending college. Not all agents with high talent for routine labor will refrain
from pursuing college. Some may have enough manual and abstract talent to have higher
lifetime income if they attend college that if they do not. In net, we find that a 1% decrease
in the price of computer capital reduces college attendance by 0.22%. Moreover, our model
can analyze the implications of government policies on college enrollment. For example, if
the government provides subsidies for college education, more agents will choose to attend
college. In this way, although some individuals in the lower and higher income group may
be worse off, the middle-income group is better off.
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In the literature, the effect of technological change on demand for labor has been em-
phasized. However, very few studies focus on the supply side of the labor market, especially
due to technological improvements. In our paper, we analyzed how wage polarization affects
the supply of labor in the economy and the decision to obtain higher education. Our re-
sults are consistent with Goldin and Katz (2007), who empirically show the relative growth
of college graduates differs from the relative growth in the demand for college graduates.
Our study emphasizes that wage polarization is one reason for the slowing growth rate of
college-educated workers despite high returns on education.
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A.0.1 The relationship between nf,t and ni,t
This section derives the relationship between the labor input in the final good production
(nf,t) and implementation labor (ni,t). We solve the representative agent’s problem in the
special case using the market clearing conditions. The first order conditions are
c−σt = λt
φ(nf,t + ni,t)

























Further assuming that σ = 1, γ = 1, and ϕ2 = 1, we simplify the above as
c−1t = λt (A.1)
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Substituting (A.1) and (A.2), we get

















i,t φ = αθnyt(vt(yt − ct)). (A.6)



















































nt = ni,t + nf,t.
Substituting value of nf,t into the above expression to get,
ni,t =
θnnt
θn + 1− α
− θn(1− α)
φ(θn + 1− α)
.(A.10)
We find ni,t in terms of nt as
nf,t =
(1− α)nt
θn + 1− α
+
θn(1− α)
φ(θn + 1− α)
.(A.11)
A.0.2 The sufficient condition for consumption and labor comove-
ment
In this section we show that sufficient condition for
dct
dnt


















θn + 1− α
+
θn(1− α)








θn + 1− α
+
θn(1− α)
φ(θn + 1− α)
)α(ϕ1 − 1)
ϕ1 − α x1
θnα
ϕ1 − α( θnnt
θn + 1− α
− θn(1− α)




θn + 1− α
Q = x1
( θnnt
θn + 1− α
− θn(1− α)
φ(θn + 1− α)
) θnα
ϕ1 − α α(ϕ1 − 1)
ϕ1 − α( (1− α)nt
θn + 1− α
+
θn(1− α)




φ(θn + 1− α)
.
In order to have
dct
dnt
> 0 it requires R > S as
( (1− α)nt
θn + 1− α
+
θn(1− α)
φ(θn + 1− α)
)α(ϕ1 − 1)




θn + 1− α
− θn(1− α)





θn + 1− α
> x1
( θnnt
θn + 1− α
− θn(1− α)
φ(θn + 1− α)
) θnα
ϕ1 − α α(ϕ1 − 1)
ϕ1 − α( (1− α)nt
θn + 1− α
+
θn(1− α)




φ(θn + 1− α)
.
Further simplification yields
θn > (ϕ1 − 1). (A.13)




B.0.1 The reduced form system of equations



































































































































































































































































t − βst+1zx2t+1q−x3t+1 ). (B.6)
Further add and subtract
1
φ























































Equations (B.7) and (B.6) are the final form of the reduced system of equllibrium conditions
in our model.
B.0.2 Deriving conditions for indeterminacy






























x3z1−x2(α + qαφ− qφϕ)
ϕφx1
)




















Next simplify both of the equations by using the steady state values of q and z and the












and the second equation
q̃t+1 =









Put the above equations in the matrix form,

































































and M2 = −Bθ 1β
1 −C






















































































Bα − θϕ + Cϕ 1
β
(1 − α)(1 − β)
)















Then since the condition on this is the absolute value, the opposite of this need to be




















In this section we show the details derivations of the soultions of tM , tR, tA mentioned in
Section 2.2. First, the income for the non-college workers in the first period is
max
{tM ,tR,tA}
(ωMhM + ωRhR + ωAhA)(1− T ) (C.1)
subject to









1− tc = tM + tR + tA.
FOCs for the first-period of life are
ωMαzM t
α−1
M (1− T ) = λ1 (C.2)
ωRαzRt
α−1
R (1− T ) = λ1 (C.3)
ωAαzAt
α−1
A (1− T ) = λ1 (C.4)
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where λ1 is the Lagrange multiplier of the time constraint.
Now substitute (C.2), (C.3) into (C.4). the above expressions to get,
ωRαzRt
α−1
R (1− T ) = ωMαzM t
α−1
M (1− T ).
ωAαzAt
α−1
A (1− T ) = ωMαzM t
α−1
M (1− T ).
Simplifying the above expression gives,
ωRαzRt
α−1





A = ωMαzM t
α−1
M . (C.5)










1− α tM .
The second-period problem for non-college workers can be written as
max
{tM ,tR,tA}





1 = tM + tR + tA.
FOCs for the second period of life are
ωMαzM t
α−1
M (1− T )(1 +
γ
rkr
) = λ2 (C.6)
ωRαzRt
α−1
R (1− T )(1 +
γ
rkr




A (1− T )(1 +
γ
rkr
) = λ2 (C.8)
where λ2 is the Lagrange multiplier of the time constraint.
Now substitute (C.6), (C.7) into (C.8). the above expressions to get,
ωRαzRt
α−1
R (1− T )(1 +
γ
rkr
) = ωMαzM t
α−1
M (1− T )
ωAαzAt
α−1
A (1− T )(1 +
γ
rkr
) = ωMαzM t
α−1
M (1− T ).







1− α + (ωRzR)
1










1− α + (ωRzR)
1










1− α + (ωRzR)
1




Now consider the agent who goes to college. The agent spends tc unit of time in college
and so has (1− tc) units of time for work in the first period. The first-period problem is
max
{tM ,tR,tA}
(ωMhM + ωRhR + ωAhA)
γη
rk
(1− T )− (1−Gs)X
subject to
1− tc = tM + tR + tA.
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1− α + (ωRzR)
1










1− α + (ωRzR)
1










1− α + (ωRzR)
1




Also, the solutions in the second period of life, where the agents have one unit of time to
work are same as the non-college individuals.
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